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A FIDUCIARY JUDGE'S GUIDE TO AWARDING
FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS
Brian T. Fitzpatrick*
It is often said thatjudges act as fiduciariesfor the absent class members
in class action litigation. If we take this seriously, how then should judges
awardfees to the lawyers who represent these class members? The answer
is to awardfees the same way rational class members would want if they
could do it on their own. In this Essay, I draw on economic models and data
from the marketfor legal representation of sophisticatedclients to describe
what these fee practices should look like. Although more data from
sophisticatedclients is no doubt needed, what we do know calls into question
severalfee practices that are in common use today: (1) presuming that class
counsel should earn only 25 percent of any recovery, (2) reducing that
percentagefurther if class counsel recovers more than $100 million, and (3)
reducing that percentage even further if it exceeds class counsel's lodestar
by some multiple.
INTRODUCTION

Judges take a much more active role in class action litigation than they do
in individual litigation. First and foremost, they decide whether the case will
proceed as a class action on behalf of absent parties.l In doing so, they decide
whether the litigation will bind the absent class members at all. They also
decide which lawyers will represent absent class members, 2 whether and on
what terms absent class members will settle, 3 and how much absent class
members must pay their lawyers. 4
Judges do these things because absent class members are involuntary
plaintiffs. Sometimes they are stuck in the class action whether they like it
* Professor of Law and Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise, Vanderbilt Law
School. This Essay was prepared for the Colloquium entitled The Judicial Role in
ProfessionalRegulation, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law

and Ethics on October 9, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Lynn
Baker, Sam Issacharoff, Alon Klement, Rick Marcus, Steve Shavell, Charlie Silver, Kathy
Spier, and the participants at a faculty workshop at the University of California Hastings
College of the Law, as well as at this Colloquium for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Thanks as well to Peter Byrne and Will Cox for excellent research assistance.
1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
2. Id. r. 23(g).
3. Id. r. 23(e).
4. See id. r. 23(h).
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or not because they are not allowed to opt out. 5 Even when they can opt out,
sometimes they do not receive notice that they are even part of the class
action. 6 Even when they can opt out and do receive notice, there may be no
point to opting out because they have so little at stake they would never sue
on their own. 7 Judges therefore step in to make decisions on their behalves.
For this reason, it is often said that judges act as fiduciaries for absent class
members. 8 This description may be more figurative than literal because
judges do not dwell on the implications of that description when they
discharge their duties in class actions. 9 But in this Essay, I take the
description seriously and ask what it means for one of those duties: the duty
to decide how much absent class members must pay the lawyers appointed
to represent them.
It is important to note that this is not the only perspective from which we
might try to guide fee decisions in class action litigation. For example, we
might put to the side the private interests of class members and focus instead
on what fees are best for social welfare. I have taken that perspective in the
past. 10 But in this Essay, I wish to try something different: how should
judges set fees if they are really acting as fiduciaries to class members?
Drawing on agency law, my answer is that judges should set fees in the
same way rational class members would have set them at the outset of the
case if they had had the opportunity to do so. If judges could perfectly
5. Id. r. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).

6. Id. r. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring courts to direct only "the best notice that is practicable
under the circumstances"); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,

314 (1950) (holding that notice need only be "reasonably calculated . . to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections").
7. See BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS 59-61

(2019) (noting that class actions are necessary because individuals lack the incentive to sue to
remedy small harms); id. at 88 (noting that class members often do expend much effort to
collect payments from the class fund); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of
Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (2004) (finding that "opt-out . .

rates increase as per capita

recovery increases").
8. See, e.g., Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 814
F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 2016); Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 2010);
Rodriguez v. West Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Wireless Tel. Fed.
Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002) ("We and other courts have gone so far as to term

the district judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class."); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 225 (5th Cir. 1981); Ray v. Mechel

Bluestone, Inc., No. 15-CV-03014, 2018 WL 1309731, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 13, 2018);
Jackson v. Innovative Sec. Servs., LLC, 283 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2012); In re Lupron Mktg.
& Sales Pracs. Litig., 345 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (D. Mass. 2004); see also 4 WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:40 (5th ed. 2020) (noting that in class action

litigation "the law requires the judge to act as a fiduciary" of absent class members).
9. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actionsfrom the Bench: Judging

Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1322 ("[C]ourts portraying
themselves as fiduciaries fail to articulate what the status requires in this context, much less
what they have done to satisfy their fiduciary duties for the benefit of absent class members.").
10. See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010).
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monitor class counsel, any fee arrangement that class counsel would accept
would work because the judge could always ensure that counsel would work
hard for the class. But it is not realistic to think that class counsel can be
monitored perfectly-and it may not even be realistic to think that class
counsel can be monitored well (particularly when the monitoring is usually
done at the end of the process rather than during). What would rational class
members want then? In this Essay, I draw on two sources to answer this
question: economic models of rational actors and data from marketplaces
where clients exhibit their actual preferences.
According to the economic models, there is no fee formula that entirely
relieves clients of monitoring lawyers who work on contingency, like class
counsel does. Moreover, the models are indeterminate: the optimal formula
depends on how well clients can monitor and what clients can monitor best.
For example, the well-known formula that pays lawyers a percentage of what
they recover requires clients to monitor against their lawyers settling cases
prematurely for a smaller recovery than would have been obtained had the
litigation continued; the lower the percentage, the greater the need to monitor.
This danger of premature settlement can be mitigated by paying a percentage
that escalates as the litigation matures or the recovery increases. The danger
can be all but eliminated by a formula that pays a percentage plus a fee equal
to the lawyer's normal hourly rate for the hours worked to achieve the
recovery-i.e., contingent lodestar plus percentage-but then this requires
the client to verify the lawyer's lodestar. Whether the percentage method or
the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage method is preferable will therefore
depend on which sort of monitoring the client prefers: verifying the lodestar
or guarding against premature settlement.
The data we have from the marketplace for contingent representation
shows that clients prefer to monitor against premature settlement over
verifying the lodestar. No one-not even the most sophisticated clientappears to use the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage formula. Rather,
drawing on preexisting data and new data I recently collected, I show that
even sophisticated clients use the percentage method. Moreover, they use
the same fixed and escalating percentages that unsophisticated clients use.
These clients do this even in the most enormous cases, where we would
expect the lawyers to benefit from economies of scale.
What does this mean for judges in class action cases? I think it means that
judges have two options. If judges believe they are better at monitoring class
counsel's lodestar than they are at monitoring against premature settlement,
then they could try to use the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage method.
But to use this method, judges must have some way to determine the right
percentage. In the absence of any data from the marketplace-as I said, this
method is not used in the marketplace-the only way for judges to do that is
to hold an auction for class counsel. But that introduces a host of other
problems that I will discuss. If judges do not believe they can make auctions
work, or, like sophisticated clients, they believe they are better at monitoring
against premature settlement, then judges should probably pay class counsel
a fixed percentage of one-third of the recovery or percentages that escalate
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even higher as litigation matures. These conclusions call into question
several fee practices commonly used by judges today: (1) presuming that
class counsel should earn only 25 percent of any recovery, (2) reducing that
percentage further if class counsel recovers more than $100 million, and (3)
reducing that percentage even further if it exceeds class counsel's lodestar by
some multiple.
I. JUDGES AS FIDUCIARIES

What does it mean to say that judges act as fiduciaries for absent class
members? If we want to take this claim seriously, it means that judges are
acting as agents for absent class members. 11 Like any other agent, that means
a judge should do what absent class members would have done if they had
been able to interact with class counsel directly. 12
The Restatement (Third) of the Law of Agency says that agents should do
what their principals would "reasonably" want them to do unless they receive
explicit instructions otherwise. 13 This means that when acting on behalf of
absent class members, judges should assume that such members would be
rationalwhen interacting with class counsel. We are all familiar with the
findings from behavioral economics showing that we are often systematically
irrational. 14 But judges should ignore these findings; by definition, absent
class members are not in a position to give judges explicit instructions to
follow irrational practices. Thus, judges should assume that absent class
members would interact with class counsel as their best, most rational selves.
My focus in this Essay is on attorneys' fees. Judges almost always set
attorneys' fees in class actions after the cases are over and class counsel has
already won recovery for class members. 15 At that moment, the rational
thing for absent class members to want is to keep all the recovery for

11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006) ("Agency

is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to
another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf.").
12. See id. § 8.01 (An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit
in all matters connected with the agency relationship.").
13. Id. § 8.10 (An agent has a duty, within the scope of the agency relationship, to act
reasonably and to refrain from conduct that is likely to damage the principal's enterprise.");
id. § 2.02 cmt. f ("The agent's fiduciary duty to the principal obliges the agent to interpret the
principal's manifestations so as to infer, in a reasonable manner, what the principal desires to
be done in light of facts of which the agent has notice at the time of acting."); id. cmt. h ( [I]f
it is normally not reasonable to believe that the principal will benefit from an act, a reasonable
agent should not infer that the principal wishes the agent to do the act and therefore should not
commit the act unless the principal communicates specifically that the principal wishes the act
to be done.").
14. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 104 (noting that "people, it turns out, are not very
rational," briefly discussing the wealth of literature "showing how all of us make the same
types of mistakes over and over again when we try to process information," and citing
sources).
15. See id. at 91 ("[J]udges almost always set the fee award at the end of the case."); id.
at 87 ("[M]any courts wait to see how many class members apply for money before awarding
fees.").
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themselves and give none of it to class counsel. 16 But, of course, if that is
what judges did, then lawyers would never take on class action cases because
they would know that they would get stiffed at the end. Absent class
members would obviously not want that in the long run. Thus, when it comes
to attorneys' fees, absent class members acting as their best, most rational
selves would want to pay class counsel at the end of the case the amount they
would have paid class counsel to take the case to begin with-what we often
call "ex ante." As good fiduciaries, then, that is exactly what judges should
do as well.
II. How WOULD RATIONAL CLASS MEMBERS PAY THEIR LAWYERS Ex
ANTE?

The lawyers who take on class action cases are usually paid only from the
class's recovery. 17 This means they are lawyers who work on contingency:
if they recover nothing, they get paid nothing; even if they recover
something, their fees will be limited by the size of the recovery. 18 How
would rational absent class members want to pay lawyers, ex ante, who work
on contingency like this? There are two sources of insight we can call on to
answer this question: economic models of rational actors and data from the
marketplace where clients exhibit their actual preferences. I will draw on
these sources in turn below, but it is important to note that they both come
with limitations. First, economic models are purely theoretical and one
always worries theoretical models are incomplete. Second, most of the data
comes from the marketplace for representation of unsophisticated clients.
One might worry that the findings from behavioral economics mentioned
above taint this data. Moreover, this data comes from cases involving
individual representation, not class cases. This is because, other than
auctions for class counsel (which I will address below), there is no market in
class cases. Fees are set by judges, not by clients. This is important because
some think that lawyers who take class cases benefit from economies of scale
compared to individual cases; therefore, the individual-case market may not
be very probative of what absent class members would need to pay a lawyer
to take a class action. 19 One possible way to overcome both of these

16. See id. at 91 (noting that the short-term rational decision for a class member paying
his lawyer at the end of the case is to "give him as little as possible so I can keep as much as
possible for myself!").
17. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2051 ("In most cases, ... fee awards come from
proceeds that would otherwise go to class members."). An interesting example to the contrary
is Hyland v. Navient Corp., No. 18-CV-9031, 2019 WL 2918238 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2020),

which describes a class counsel who was paid noncontingent fees by the American Federation
of Teachers.
18. See Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, Incentive Structuresfor ClassAction Lawyers,

20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 102, 108-09 (2004) (noting that "[a]y noncontingent fee [is] infeasible
in this context" and "the attorney can never collect a fee higher than the actual amount
recovered").
19. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2063 (" [A]ggregate litigation permits plaintiffs to
reap the benefits of economies of scale in litigation, and, in a competitive marketplace, one
might expect those economies to be passed on to clients in the form of lower attorneys' fees.").
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limitations is to focus on data from sophisticated corporate clients who hire
lawyers in high-stakes cases-i.e., clients for whom the behavioral findings
are less relevant 20 and cases that might offer their own economies of scale.
This will be my strategy below.
A. Economic Models
How do the economic models suggest rational class members should pay
lawyers who work on contingency, like class counsel? Most of the literature
compares two formulas: the lodestar method and the percentage method. 2 1
The lodestar method pays the lawyer a fee equal to the number of hours the
lawyer worked multiplied by the lawyer's normal hourly rate.
The
percentage method pays the lawyer a fee equal to some percentage of the
amount recovered for the client. But most of the literature compares the
percentage method to the non-contingent-lodestar method. 22 The contingentlodestar method that must be considered here is typically assessed only in the
literature on class actions, 23 statutory fee shifting, 24 and the English civil
justice system (where the percentage method is forbidden and contingent
agreements can only use the lodestar method).25 The contingent-lodestar
method differs from the noncontingent method not only because payment is
guaranteed only in the latter but because the former permits enhancement of
the lodestar by a discretionary number (the multiplier) to compensate for that
risk of nonpayment. 26
If clients could perfectly monitor their lawyers and thereby eliminate
agency costs-that is, if clients could ensure their lawyers would do exactly
what they wanted them to do every time-it would not matter which of these
arrangements was employed. Indeed, clients could even pay their lawyers
fixed fees. In all these arrangements, the outcome for the clients would be
exactly the same. Clients would presumably want the arrangement that

20. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 104 (noting that behavioral law and economics does

not suggest that "the teams of people who run corporations are systematically irrational in the
same way the rest of us are").
21. See, e.g., Lynn Baker, Comment, Facts About Fees: Lessons for Legal Ethics, 80
TEX. L. REv. 1985, 1986 (2002).
22. See, e.g., id; Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, ContingentFees, in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 415, 416 (Peter Newman ed., 2002)

("It is common to compare a contingency fee arrangement with the alternative in which an
attorney is paid an hourly wage.").
23. See, e.g., FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 85-98 (explaining the pros and cons of the

contingent-lodestar method and the percentage method); Klement & Neeman, supra note 18,
at 108-110; William Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs'Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee
in Class-Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 191-95 (1994).
24. See, e.g., Maureen Carroll, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensationfor Risk, 95 IND.
L.J. 1021, 1048-61 (2020) (discussing different fee arrangements, including statutory fee
shifting); Martha Pacold, Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-

Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1007 (2001).
&

25. See, e.g., Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style
ConditionalFees: Agency Problems and the Supply of Legal Services, 27 MANAGERIAL
DECISIONS ECON. 379 (2006).
26. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2051.
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would be cheapest in a given case, but depending on the relative risk aversion
of client and lawyer, we could imagine them agreeing to any arrangement.
We can quickly put aside the model where clients can perfectly monitor
their lawyers. I doubt any client can do that-this is why there is an entire
field of economics that studies agency costs-but it is certainly not possible
in class action cases. The clients-class members-are, by definition,
absent.27 Moreover, their monitor-the judge acting as their fiduciary-is
an imperfect monitor at best. As scholars have long noted, judges do not
exercise day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month, or sometimes even
year-to-year oversight of class counsel. 28 They are passive monitors until a
milestone like settlement presents itself in the litigation. 2 9 Asking a judge to
enter the litigation at a milestone and understand the intricacies of what has
transpired is a tall order. 30 It is an even taller order in light of the docket
pressure that incentivizes judges to rubber-stamp whatever class counsel and
the defendant have agreed to. 3 1 For class actions, we need a model that
assumes clients cannot monitor their lawyers perfectly-or even well.
What do models like this tell us? I will assume that client and attorney
have the same information about the merits of the case for simplicity. 32
Moreover, I will assume that any recovery will come in cash; the client's
options become much narrower if the recovery is injunctive or declaratory.
Even with these assumptions, there is no formula that frees clients entirely
from monitoring. 33 The contingent-lodestar method is perhaps worst of all

27. Jam ignoring the possibility that monitoring will take place by the class representative.
Outside of securities fraud class actions, most class representatives are unsophisticated
figureheads. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1991) ("The named plaintiff does little-indeed, usually does
nothing-to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that representation is competent and
zealous, or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the class or corporation.").
28. See, e.g., Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians?: A New Approach for
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REv. LITIG. 25, 45 (2002) ("[C]ommon law courts are

institutionally incapable of obtaining information unless presented to them by the litigants.").
29. See id. at 45-46 (" [T]he paradigmatic common law court is passive and relies solely
on the adversary process for its education about the case.").
30. See id. at 45 ("Constrained by the institutional requirements of neutrality and passivity
set by the adversary system ... courts have been left, by and large, uninformed about the
parameters necessary to effectively regulate class attorneys.").
31. See id. at 47 ("On top of these institutional barriers, courts are also constrained by
their limited resources. Dockets are full, and support personnel are scarce. Conducting
meaningful investigations without the necessary means is often unworkable. Moreover, in the
specific context of attorney fee applications, courts are expected to apply restraint and limit
the extent of factual investigations. They are urged not to allow protracted satellite litigation
and to control and expedite fee award determinations." (footnote omitted)).
32. For models that relax that assumption, see, for example, James Dana & Kathryn Spier,
Expertise and Contingent Fees:
The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney
Compensation, 9 J.L. ECON. ORG. 349 (1993); Klement & Neeman, supra note 18; see also

Rubinfeld & Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 417-18 (summarizing these models).
33. The only thing that frees clients from monitoring is the outright sale of their claims to
their lawyers. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 108 (proposing an auction approach
where "[t]he winning bidder becomes the owner of the claim, and therefore acts as its own
agent").
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because it renders the lawyer completely indifferent to the magnitude of
recovery and adverse to the client on the speed with which it comes about;
the client would have to monitor to ensure the lawyer does not prolong the
case or recommend an inadequate settlement. 34 It is true that the lawyer
might feel constrained by professional or ethical norms, but those, too, are
hard to monitor. The percentage method is better because the lawyer is not
indifferent to the size or speed of recovery; like the client, the lawyer wants
a big recovery and the lawyer wants it quickly. 35 But the percentage causes
the lawyer to want to settle too quickly: if the fee percentage is less than 100
percent, then the lawyer must bear all the effort of going forward with the
litigation while collecting only a fraction of the return on the effort. This
incentivizes the lawyer to want to settle prematurely, even if it means a
smaller recovery, so the client must monitor to ensure that does not happen. 36
The lower the percentage, the greater the divergence between the interests of
client and lawyer. The optimal fixed percentage therefore depends on how
well the client can monitor against premature settlement. 37 The danger of
premature settlement can be mitigated if the fee percentage escalates as the
recovery increases or the litigation matures, but it cannot be eliminated. 38
34. See Emons & Garoupa, supra note 25, at 380 (" [C]ontingent fees are more efficient

than conditional fees."); Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2051-52 ("Under the lodestar method,
class counsel's compensation increased the longer the litigation wore on; class members, by
contrast, prefer cases to end as quickly as possible so they can receive their compensation as
quickly as possible. Moreover, class counsel were compensated irrespective of how much
they recovered for the class; class members, by contrast, prefer to receive as much as
possible."); Klement & Neeman, supra note 18, at 108-10; Lynk, supra note 23, at 191-95.
35. See Emons & Garoupa, supra note 25, at 380; Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2052 ("To

better align the interests of class counsel and the class, judges began compensating class
counsel by awarding them a percentage of the class's recovery. This way, the more the class
recovers, the more class counsel are paid, and class counsel have no incentive to drag cases
on unnecessarily.").
36. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 435

(2009) ("Under contingency fee arrangements ... the lawyer . . press [es] for settlement more
often than when the settlement offer exceeds the expected judgment net of litigation costs
because the lawyer bears all the litigation costs but obtains only a percentage of the
settlement."); Lynk, supra note 23, at 194; Murray Schwartz & Daniel Mitchell, An Economic

Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-InjuryLitigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).
But see Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, A Note on Settlements Under the Contingent
Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 217 (2002) ("[T]he

lawyer could have an insufficient motive to settle, the opposite of what is usually believed.").
37. See Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 508-

11 (1996) (noting that the optimal fee minimizes the agency costs generated from a lawyer's
underinvestment in the claim and rent-seeking behavior).
38. See John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement ofLaw Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669, 697 (1986) ("[T]he most logical answer to this problem of premature

settlement would be to base fees on a graduated, increasing percentage of the recovery
formula-one that operates, much like the Internal Revenue Code, to award the plaintiff's
attorney a marginally greater percentage of each defined increment of the recovery. While
this approach cannot be said to eliminate the inevitable tension between the interests of
plaintiff's attorneys and their clients in class actions, it can at least partially counteract the
tendency for premature settlements."); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Chopping Block:
Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 679 (2002)

(By increasing the reward to counsel, increasing percentage bids reduce the incentive for
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The closest we can come to eliminating the danger of premature settlement
is to use the formula devised many years ago by Kevin Clermont and John
Currivan: contingent lodestar plus percentage. 39 Here, the client pays the
lawyer an hourly rate, only if there is some recovery, plus a percentage of
that recovery. 40 This formula pits the contingent-lodestar and percentage
methods against one another to improve on them both: the percentage
component of the formula incentivizes the lawyer to care about the
magnitude and speed of the recovery, while the lodestar component mitigates
the incentive to settle prematurely. But even this formula does not entirely
eliminate the problem of premature settlement. 4 1 Moreover, it introduces a
new monitoring need: the client needs to verify that the lawyer's lodestar is
not inflated.
The economic models are therefore indeterminate. It is possible the
contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage formula is what a rational absent class
member would want, but it is also possible that a rational absent class
member would want the percentage method. It depends on whether it would
be easier to monitor against premature settlement or monitor the lodestar. It
is possible a rational absent class member would want to pay a low fixed
percentage, a high fixed percentage, or a marginally escalating percentage.
It depends on how easy it is to monitor against premature settlement.
B. Datafrom SophisticatedClients
The data on the contingent-fee arrangements clients choose in the
marketplace strongly suggests that clients prefer to monitor against
premature settlement than to monitor the lawyer's lodestar. The most famous

cheap settlements and motivate counsel to pursue high levels of recovery."); Bruce L. Hay,
Optimal ContingentFees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 260 (1997) ("[T]he
bifurcated fee structure is preferable to the unitary structure .. . . The optimal bifurcated fee
often couples a relatively high trial percentage for the lawyer (one that would be excessive if
the case were actually going to trial) with a relatively low settlement percentage. The rationale
of the large trial percentage is that it generates a large settlement; the rationale of the small
settlement percentage is that it avoids paying the lawyer for (trial) work he does not
perform.").
39. See Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the ContingentFee, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 529, 530 (1978).

40. See id. at 581 ("The contingent hourly-percentage fee is payable only in the event of
recovery and equals the sum of two components: (1) the lawyer's time charge for the hours
devoted to the case; and (2) a percentage (x) of the amount by which the recovery (s) exceeds
that time charge." (footnotes omitted)).
41. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and
Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 165, 182 n.30 (2003) ("This payment scheme is only fully

successful, however, if the plaintiff is certain to obtain a settlement or a trial victory.").
Although there are ways to perfect the formula, they are complex and involve third parties; as
such I am not sure how realistic the perfections are. See id. at 166-69 (proposing a variation
in which a third-party administrator "will contract with the lawyer and agree to pay him for
the appropriate fraction of his time"); Alon Klement et al, Auctioning Class Action
Representation 4 (Sept. 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law

Review) ("The proposed auction is divided into two stages. In the first stage, risk neutral
insurers bid the highest percentage they are willing to pay the representing lawyer, over the
hours she invests in the case.").
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studies come from Herbert Kritzer, who surveyed lawyers who work on
contingency in Wisconsin. 42 Ninety-five percent of clients chose the
percentage method. 43 Most of the time, the agreements employed fixed
percentages (most often one-third but occasionally one-fourth), but
sometimes the agreements employed percentages that escalated as the
litigation matured. 44 None of the percentages escalated or deescalated with
the size of the recovery except percentages that escalated for clients who
already had a settlement offer when they hired the lawyer. 45 The other 5
percent was split among a variety of methods with a contingent component,
but none of them appeared to be contingent lodestar plus percentage. 46
The Kritzer studies are largely based on fee agreements with
unsophisticated clients. 47 For the reasons I noted above, I doubt whether
such agreements reflect our best, most rational selves. As I said, I prefer to
examine fee agreements with sophisticated clients like large corporations.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find systematic data from large
corporations. Most of the time, of course, they do not hire lawyers on
contingency at all; rather, they pay them by the hour with a non-contingentlodestar method. But there are two areas of litigation where this is not true:
patent cases and, of all things, class action cases-in particular, the small
number of class action cases comprised of corporate class members.
Although there is not much systematic data on the fee agreements
sophisticated clients use in these areas, the data that exists all points to the
same conclusion: sophisticated clients are just like unsophisticated ones.
That is, they use the percentage method, either with fixed percentages or
escalating percentages as litigation matures. Moreover, despite the enormous
stakes in some of these cases, the percentages are the same ones that
unsophisticated clients with smaller cases choose. The contingent-lodestarplus-percentage formula is nowhere to be found.

42. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS 19 (2004) ("[T]he

geographical focus of my research is the state of Wisconsin .... My initial data collection
was a survey of Wisconsin contingency fee practitioners .... "). Eric Helland and Seth
Seabury have surveyed the other studies and found that they all "are quite consistent in their
findings. Fees are typically 33 percent." Eric Helland & Seth A. Seabury, Contingent-Fee
Contracts in Litigation: A Survey and Assessment, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF TORTS 383, 385 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013).
43. KRITZER, supranote 42, at 39.
44. See id. at 39-40.
45. See id. at 40.

46. See id. Although some of these methods combined lodestar and percentage
components, none of the lodestar components were contingent. See id. The only examples of
the contingent lodestar plus percentage I have seen are in cases where there could be fee
shifting: the lawyer might be able to receive a lodestar-based fee-shifting award as well as a
percentage of the recovery. See 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEY'S FEES § 10.6 (3d. ed. 2020)
(" [Some] courts have held or indicated that an attorney may retain both the fee award and the
contingent fee where the fee agreement provides for such a result.").
47. KRITZER, supra note 42, at 35 (noting that "personal injury was the dominant type of

case" handled by the lawyers who responded to the survey).
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Let me begin with patent litigation. The best study here comes from
Professor David Schwartz. 48 Professor Schwartz interviewed patent lawyers
and their clients in 2010 and 2011 and obtained copies of their contingentfee agreements. 49 Many of these cases presented enormous potential
damages. 50 Nonetheless, he found that corporations that hire patent litigators
on contingency use the same two types of fee agreements that unsophisticated
clients do. Those two types were fixed percentages (he found a mean of 38.6
percent) or escalating percentages as the litigation matured (he found a mean
upon filing of 28 percent and, through appeal, of 40.2 percent), with more
clients choosing the latter over the former. 51 No one escalated or deescalated
based on recovery size.
Now consider corporate class action litigation. One place to find data here
is in the antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical industry where large
corporations sue each other. 52 With a research assistant, I recently collected
systematic data in these cases. The cases pitted a class of approximately
twenty drug wholesalers-many of which are Fortune 500 companies, some
at the very top of that list-against drug manufacturers accused of exploiting
their monopolies to inflate drug prices. The potential damages in many of
these cases were enormous. The first case in the series settled in April 2003,
and, although the cases continue, I stopped collecting them for this Essay in
April 2020. During those seventeen years, there have been thirty-three cases;
in the Appendix, I set forth the following details about them: how much each
case resolved for, how much was sought by class counsel in fees, what the
retainer agreements between class counsel and the corporate class
representative said, and any positive or negative reaction to the fee requests
from the corporate class members. Although the fee requests ranged from a
fixed percentage of 27.5 percent to a fixed percentage of one-third, one-third
heavily dominated: the average was 32.85 percent. (The requests in the
Appendix that were near one-third were one-third requests inclusive of
48. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 356-57 (2012).
49. See id at 356-57.

50. See id at 363 ("[The most elite contingent-fee patent litigators] select cases that they
perceive to be strong on the merits, and importantly, to have extremely high potential damages.
For example, one lawyer in this category explained: '$25 million expected value against one
infringer. That's the general rule.' Others had similar high cut points, saying things like 'we'd
like to be at $100 million on our cases. Those are good cases. The very least, I don't take a
case unless we think we could pull in well into 8 figures. "' (footnote omitted)).
51. See id at 360.
52. Securities fraud class actions are another area of potential data because large
sophisticated institutions serve at least as the representative class members. But efforts to
systematically collect retainer agreements here have thus far failed because the agreements
are rarely publicly disclosed. See Lynn A. Baker et al., Is the Price Right?: An Empirical

Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1389-91 (2015)
("The study's analysis began by looking for cases in which proposed lead plaintiffs offered
the court proof of the ex ante fee agreements they had negotiated. Although Congress and the
drafters of the lead plaintiff mechanism seemed to anticipate that such agreements would be
the norm, there is little evidence that they play a significant role in a court's selection of the
lead plaintiff. There were very few cases-just 11.29%-in which the lead plaintiff candidate
or the court discussed an ex ante agreement during the appointment process.").
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litigation expenses.)
Moreover, although I was able to find retainer
agreements in only three of the cases, in all of them, the agreement called for
a fixed percentage of one-third. Finally, in the vast majority of cases, one or
more of these corporate class members-often the biggest class memberscame forward to voice affirmative support for the fee requests, and not a
single one of these corporate class members objected to the fee request in any
of the thirty-three cases. Although this support among class members for
class counsel's fee requests is not formally ex ante market data-the support
came at the end of the cases-because it was the same class of corporations
in case after case and often the same counsel in case after case, class members
could have tried to alter this pattern at any time. But they did not; they have
gone along with it for seventeen years. In other words, the corporations in
these cases appear perfectly happy with the percentage method and perfectly
happy with the same fixed percentage of one-third that most unsophisticated
clients also choose.
Although we obviously need more corporate data to draw any firm
conclusions, the data we do have forces us to ask why even sophisticated
clients eschew the elegance of the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage
formula. One possibility is that the economic modeling is simply missing
something. As I noted at the outset, this is one of the limitations of using
economic models that are unconfirmed by empirical investigation. Another
possibility is path dependence: contingency agreements have been using the
percentage method with a one-third percentage for a very long time; maybe
inertia explains why that has not changed. 53 On the other hand, the ClermontCurrivan paper has been around for decades and corporate clients are
experimenting with many other fee arrangements; why not with this one too?
The best answer in my view is something I mentioned above: monitoring
preference. Sophisticated clients may find it easier to monitor against
premature settlement than they do their lawyers' lodestars. Hence, they
choose the percentage method over the contingent lodestar plus percentage.
Indeed, dissatisfaction with the lodestar is what has driven them to consider
alternative fee arrangements in the first place. 54
Why these sophisticated clients did not negotiate lower fee percentages
than those unsophisticated clients pay is a more difficult question. The sizes
of the cases discussed above are large enough that one would think they
would present similar economies of scale to the largest class actions; 55
indeed, some of the cases were the largest class actions. 56 It may be that it is

53. Cf Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, "Sticky"Arbitration Clauses?: The
Use ofArbitration ClausesAfter Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REv. 955, 959 (2014)

(" [C]ontracts . .. may be 'sticky' and resistant to change.").
See generally 1 JOHN K. VILLA, CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDELINES § 4:7 (2020).
55. See Silverman v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Many costs
54.

of litigation do not depend on the outcome; it is almost as expensive to conduct discovery in
a $100 million case as in a $200 million case .

. .

. There may be some marginal costs of

bumping the recovery from $100 million to $200 million, but as a percentage of the
incremental recovery these costs are bound to be low.").
56. See Appendix.
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expensive to negotiate away from the default one-third arrangement; there
are not only transaction costs but strategic uncertainties to consider if the
parties have asymmetric information about the merits (something I assumed
away when discussing the economic models). 57 A further explanation is that
the investment needed to win the cases examined above may have correlated
with the stakes of the cases. If this was so, the optimal fixed percentage
would remain constant even as the stakes increased. 58 A final explanation is
simply that they do not want to exacerbate agency costs and thereby increase
the burden of monitoring against premature settlement that comes along with
lower percentages. 59
In any event, although more data is certainly needed, the data we have
from sophisticated clients shows that they prefer the same arrangements that
unsophisticated clients do: the percentage method with fixed percentages of
one-third or escalating percentages as the litigation matures.
III. WHAT SHOULD JUDGES DO IN CLASS ACTIONS?
The previous part showed that economic modeling is indeterminate on
how rational absent class members would want to pay class counsel. If it is
easier to verify class counsel's lodestar than it is to monitor against premature
settlement, then the models suggest the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage
method is ideal. But if it is easier to monitor against premature settlement,
the percentage method is better. Whether the percentage should be fixed or
escalating and what the percentage should be depends on how well the client
can monitor against premature settlement. The (albeit limited) data from
sophisticated clients in the market suggests that they believe it is easier to
monitor against premature settlement, because they uniformly select the
percentage method. The data is mixed between fixed and escalating
percentages, but all of the escalation comes from litigation maturity, not
recovery size.
Where does that leave our judges overseeing class actions? Although more
data is needed to draw firm conclusions, based on what we know, I think
judges acting as good fiduciaries could responsibly discharge their duties
with either the percentage method or the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage
method. But, for the reasons I explain now, I think judges should usually
choose the percentage method. I also think this percentage should either be
fixed or escalate with litigation maturity.

57. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Another explanation comes from Eyal
Zamir et al., Who Benefits from the Uniformity of ContingentFee Rates?, 9 REv. L. & ECON.

357, 359 (2013) ("The non-negotiability of the ... rate precludes lawyers from exploiting their
private information about the expected value of the lawsuit and the amount of work it might
entail. Clients with a good sense of the ranking of lawyers are able to hire the best lawyer
among the ones who are willing to handle the case. The uniformity also enables the clients to
retain the transaction's entire surplus.").
58. See Hay, supra note 37, at 519 ("[C]ases in which the ceiling is high but in which it is
costly for the lawyer to move upward should involve the same fee as cases in which the ceiling
is low but in which it is easy for the lawyer to move upward." (emphasis omitted)).
59. See id. at 511.
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A. Best Practices

First, for the same reason sophisticated corporations seem to opt for the
percentage method, so should judges: it will usually be easier for judges to
monitor against premature settlement than to verify the lodestar. It is true
that judges have experience verifying lodestars; they do it frequently in feeshifting and bankruptcy cases. 60 But that was true of our corporate clients as
well; they pay lawyers noncontingent lodestars all the time. Even still,
corporate clients apparently believe it is easier to guard against premature
settlement when they hire on contingency. I think the same is probably true
for judges. They should be able to look at a case and assess what it is worth
in light of the various legal and factual risks more easily than they can assess
how many hours it should take to litigate it. Many judges are long out of
practice or never practiced in class actions at all. Yet, they observe the
outcomes in a variety of cases every single day.
Second, the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage method comes with an
added challenge: it is more difficult to choose the percentage. As I noted
above, although the economic models are indeterminate on the right
percentage for the percentage method, we at least have data on what even
sophisticated clients in enormous cases choose when they use this method.
We can use this data to set percentages in class action cases if we use the
percentage method. But we do not have such data for the contingentlodestar-plus-percentage formula because no one uses it. That means judges
will have to figure out what the "market" percentage is in this formula
through other means.
One way to do this is to create market-like competition by holding an
auction for class counsel. Judges could ask lawyers to compete for the right
to represent the class by bidding on the smallest percentage they would be
willing to accept in the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage formula. In
theory, the lowest bid would represent the market price for a class action
lawyer in that particular case. Auctions have great theoretical appeal 6 1 and
judges have even tried them a handful of times in class action cases. 62 But
judges and scholars have soured on auctions for a variety of reasons I address
below. Although judges and scholars have not considered auctions using the
contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage formula, I am not sure the reasons they
have soured on them can be overcome by it.

60. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010) ("[T]he 'lodestar'

become the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence."); 1 JOAN N. FEENEY
§ 4:38 (5th ed. 2020) ("Courts use a lodestar calculation
to determine reasonableness of any fee application.").
figure has . .

ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL

61. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 98 (noting that an auction would in theory "drive

down the winning fee percentage to the lowest possible price"); Macey & Miller, supra note
27, at 108-10 (noting that an auction could reduce agency costs and transaction costs).
62. For a detailed review of litigation where the presiding judge used an auction to select
class counsel, see LAURAL L. HOOPER & MARIE LEARY, FED. JUD. CTR., AUCTIONING THE ROLE
OF CLASS COUNSEL IN CLASS ACTION CASES:
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY (2001), https://

www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/20 12/auctioning.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QJR-F54H].
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Perhaps the most serious concern with fee auctions is that judges have
difficulty picking the winning bid. Part of this concern stems from the fact
that the judges who tried auctions permitted lawyers to submit bids that were
so complex-the lawyers often did not bid fixed percentages-that it was
difficult to figure out which bid was the lowest one. 63 I think this concern is
easy to overcome by using the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage formula:
judges could allow the lawyers to bid only on the percentage component and
only a fixed percentage. But part of the concern stems from the fact that the
lowest bidder may not be the best lawyer and it is difficult for judges to trade
quality for price. 64 This concern is not so easy to overcome. In public
contracting, this trade-off is made either by restricting bidders to those that
are well qualified for the job or by using a scoring system that tries to assign
points for price along with other considerations. 65 I could imagine using the
former approach in auctions for class counsel-for example, the judge could
limit bidders to the ten or twenty most experienced class action firms.
However, that would lock incumbents into class counsel positions and make
it difficult for new firms to enter the market. That is good neither for
competition nor for furthering the desire many have to diversify the
profession. 66 The latter approach strikes me as hopelessly subjective and

63. Fisch, supra note 38, at 674-82 (discussing the difficulty of selecting the lowest bidder
in auctions for class counsel); see also THIRD CIR. TASK FORCE ON THE SELECTION OF CLASS
COUNS., FINAL REPORT 49-51 (2002), https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/final%20
report%20f%2Othird%20circuit%2Otask%2Oforce.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7G8Y-Q7ZF]

(same).
64. See Fisch, supra note 38, at 683-90 (noting that "a lead counsel auction cannot select

among competing bids solely on the basis of price" and discussing the difficulties posed by
incorporating an analysis of firm quality into the auction process).
65. 48 C.F.R. § 9.201 (2020) ("Qualified bidders list (QBL) means a list of bidders who
have had their products examined and tested and who have satisfied all applicable qualification
requirements for that product or have otherwise satisfied all applicable qualification
requirements. Qualified manufacturers list (QML) means a list of manufacturers who have
had their products examined and tested and who have satisfied all applicable qualification
requirements for that product."); id. § 15.305 ("Proposal evaluation is an assessment of the
proposal and the offeror's ability to perform the prospective contract successfully. An agency
shall evaluate competitive proposals and then assess their relative qualities solely on the
factors and subfactors specified in the solicitation. Evaluations may be conducted using any
rating method or combination of methods, including color or adjectival ratings, numerical
weights, and ordinal rankings."); 1 STEVEN FELDMAN, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS:
NEGOTIATION AND SEALED BIDDING § 10:20 (2020) (providing an example of a scoring
system).

66. See Ralph Chapoco, Callsfor Lawyer Diversity Spread to Complex Class Litigation,
BLOOMBERGL. (July 30, 2020, 4:45 AM) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/social-justice/callsfor-lawyer-diversity-spread-to-complex-class-litigation
[https://perma.cc/CQZ6-KSGH]
("Judge James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
declined to certify two firms . . . as interim co-lead class counsel in a securities action . . .. In
a July 14 order, Donato cited 'a lack of diversity in the proposed lead counsel,' noting that all
four lead counsel were male, and [had] been lead counsel in other cases, what legal experts
refer to as 'repeat players."' (quoting Order Re: Consolidation & Interim Class Counsel, In
re Robinhood Outage Litig., No. 20-cv-01626, 2020 WL 6130884 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2020)));
see also Michael H. Hurwitz, Judge Harold Baer's Quixotic Crusade for Class Counsel
Diversity, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 321, 324-27 (2011) (discussing Judge Harold Baer's

orders imposing a diversity requirement on class counsel).
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therefore unlikely to inspire much more confidence in fee auctions than we
have today. 67
Another concern with auctions is that they can exacerbate agency costs. 68
For example, in auctions that use the percentage method, the lawyer winning
the auction with the lowest bid will also have the strongest incentive to settle
the case too early for too little. If the judge cannot monitor the lawyer well
enough, then this could end up making absent class members worse off rather
than better: they will end up paying a smaller fee percentage but on an even
smaller recovery. The contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage formula solves
this monitoring problem, but as I noted, it introduces another monitoring
problem and, if I am correct above, a worse one: verifying the lodestar
component. In short, contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage auctions are no
more promising than the percentage auctions that have largely failed. Better,
then, to stick to the percentage method where we have preexisting data to
draw on.
Third, when judges use the percentage method, the percentages should be
fixed or escalate with litigation maturity. Although it is not unheard of to use
deescalating or escalating percentages based on recovery size, I believe they
were not found in the data discussed above because it is too difficult to set
the cut points ex ante. 69 Before discovery and the like, it is difficult to know
how good or bad the case is and where to start escalating or deescalating.
The cut points for litigation maturity are well known (even if imperfect 70):
trials, appeals, and maybe a few others.
B. CurrentPracticesRevisited
The conclusions in the previous section affirm some of what judges do
now to award fees in class actions, but they call into question some of what
they do, too.

67. See 2 FELDMAN, supra note 65,

§

12:2 ("[C]ontracting officials usually have broad

discretion in determining the manner and extent to which they will make use of the technical
and cost evaluation results [to award a contract]."); THIRD CIR. TASK FORCE ON THE SELECTION
OF CLASS COUNS., supra note 63, at 51 ("The courts that have conducted auctions have

recognized that price cannot be the sole factor in awarding class counsel; there must be some
quality control as well. Yet if the court takes into account anything other than price to choose

among competing bids, it enters into the same kind of subjective determinations as occur under
the traditional method of appointing class counsel.").
68. See Fisch, supranote 38; see also THIRD CIR. TASKFORCE ON THE SELECTION OF CLASS
COUNS., supra note 63, at 45 ("The auction method could encourage firms to submit unduly

low bids in order to win the position of class counsel. Underbidding can result in lawyers
cutting corners or settling too early in order to maintain a profit margin.").
69. See Fisch, supra note 38, at 674-78 (discussing the difficulty of evaluating bids with
changing percentages).
70. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,

201 (1987) ("It is at best a rough corrective .. . because it substitutes a small number of
discrete increments for what is in fact a continuous process-the reduction in the attorney's
expected future costs as the case progresses.").
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Let me begin with the good: judges often use the percentage method to
award fees in class actions.71 This was not always the case, and much to the
credit of our judges, they have been persuaded by economic models and
market data to replace the lodestar method with the percentage method in
large numbers.72 But now the bad.
First, many judges do not use a "pure" percentage method but instead
something called the "percentage method with a lodestar cross-check." This
is something of the opposite of the Clermont-Currivan formula. Rather than
contingent lodestar plus a percentage of the recovery, this method awards a
contingent percentage capped at some multiple of the lodestar. What
multiple is used in the cap? It is up to the discretion of judges, and they seem
most interested in preventing the appearance of a "windfall" to the lawyer. 73
I have never seen the lodestar cross-check formally modeled, but it would
seem this method would behave like the percentage method when the lodestar
is high but like the contingent-lodestar method when the lodestar is low.
Because it will not be known at the outset whether a case will be a high or
low lodestar endeavor, for all the same reasons rational clients who could not
monitor well would reject the lodestar method, they would reject this method
too.7 4 Indeed, I have never seen this method used in the market for
contingency representation, whether among sophisticated or unsophisticated
clients. If judges want to do what rational absent class members would want
to do, then they should not do this.
Second, judges that use the percentage method presume that the fee
percentage in class actions should be lower than one-third. I and others have
found that the average fee percentage is only 25 percent,7 5 and some circuits
even go so far as to explicitly require district courts to presume that 25
percent is the right number. 76
But, if the data discussed above is

71. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 832 (2010) (finding that courts use the

percentage method 69 percent of the time, more often than not without the lodestar crosscheck); see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions: 2009-2013, 92

N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 945 (2017) (finding the percentage method with lodestar cross-check was
used approximately 38 percent of the time versus approximately 54 percent for the percent
method without lodestar cross-check).
72. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2052.
73. 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 8, § 15:85 ("[M]any courts also undertake a lodestar cross-

check as a means of ensuring that the percentage award is not a windfall.").
74. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 7, at 92 (explaining that the lodestar cross-check is "the

same thing as the lodestar method, just dressed up in nicer clothing"); see also Williams v.
Rohm & Haas Pension Plan, 658 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The . .

argument . .

any percentage fee award exceeding a certain lodestar multiplier is excessive . .
'megafund' cap we rejected in Synthroid.").

that

echoes the

75. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 833 (finding that "[t]he average award [under the

percentage method] was 25.4 percent and the median was 25 percent"); see also Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements:
1993-2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 241, 260 (2010) (finding that "[t]he median and

mean fee to recovery ratios were 0.24 and 0.25, respectively" in percentage method cases).
76. Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 833 ("[T]he Ninth Circuit has adopted a presumption
that 25 percent is the proper fee award percentage in class action cases."); see also Eisenberg
& Miller, supra note 75, at 259 ("The Ninth Circuit has a 25 percent benchmark fee in common
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representative, 25 percent is lower than the fixed percentages that even
sophisticated clients pay in the market for contingency representation.
The lower percentage could be justified for class settlements if judges
awarded higher percentages after class trials. This would be consistent with
the models that recommend escalating percentages as the litigation matures
as well as the market data that often shows escalating fees in patent cases
(where average percentages began at 28 percent and rose to over 40 percent
if an appeal was taken). But because trials are so rare in class actions, there
are no published studies that demonstrate that is what judges are in fact
doing.77
Rather, the lower percentage in class actions has been justified on account
of the economies of scale that come from class versus individual
representation. The notion here is that it is not one thousand times harder to
represent a class of one thousand than it is a class of one, and a competitive
market would bring marginal price down to marginal cost.78 It is true that
the economic models show that the optimal percentage is lower in higher
stakes cases if the investment required to win the cases does not go up as
quickly. 79 But the data discussed above suggests that sophisticated clients
do not negotiate lower percentages in bigger cases where we would expect
the same economies: it is not one thousand times harder to win a $10 billion
patent case than it is a $10 million one. 80 As I noted, I am not sure why
sophisticated clients do not negotiate lower percentages in their biggest
contingency cases despite the economies of scale. It could simply be a
function of the limited data, but the best explanations I can think of are that
bringing marginal price down to marginal cost is not free (it increases the
burden of monitoring against premature settlement) and negotiation
introduces transaction costs and strategic uncertainty. If corporate clients do
not think they can discharge these burdens, should judges think they can? I
don't think so; as I noted above, it is doubtful that judges are better lawyer
monitors than sophisticated corporations. Moreover, we have no way of
knowing how great the economies of scale are in any given case and,
therefore, no way of knowing what the marginal price should be-unless we
hold an auction and take on the difficulties with that, as discussed above. All
of this argues against deviating from the data from sophisticated clients in
the market for large-case contingency representation. If judges want to be
good fiduciaries for absent class members, then they should probably
presume that one-third is the correct fixed percentage, not one-fourth.
fund cases but allows departures based on individual case factors, and the Eleventh Circuit
has indicated that its district courts view 25 percent as a benchmark.").
77. Professor Bill Rubenstein, however, has proprietary data suggesting judges do this.
See Expert Declaration of William B. Rubenstein in Support of the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Attorney's Fees & Expenses at 12, Hale v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-00660 (S.D.
Ill. Oct. 16, 2018), ECF No. 954-3.

78. Fitzpatrick, supra note 10, at 2063 (" [A]ggregate litigation permits plaintiffs to reap
the benefits of economies of scale in litigation, and, in a competitive marketplace, one might
expect those economies to be passed on to clients in the form of lower attorneys' fees.").
79. See Hay, supra note 37, at 517-23.
80. See Silverman v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Third, many judges choose percentages even below 25 percent when class
counsel recovers more than $100 million simply because the recovery is so
large. As I and others have found, the average percentages judges choose are
lower in recoveries over $100 million, and they get even lower until they
reach around 10 percent in billion dollar recoveries. 81 This is even worse
than the practice I described above that presumes lawyers should get less than
one-third in a class action because the case is a class action. Rather, here,
courts are paying the lawyer a different percentage at the end of the very
same case depending on whether the lawyer recovered a lot or a little; the
more the lawyer recovered, the lower the fixed percentage awarded at the
end. This sort of arrangement would obviously fare terribly in economic
models because it dramatically exacerbates agency costs: now the lawyer
can be made better off by settling cases for smaller recoveries than larger
recoveries, even if lawyer effort is kept constant. 82 That only happens with
fixed percentages that do not vary with recovery size if lawyers can save
effort. 83 For this reason, varying a fixed percentage on recovery size like this
is unheard of in the marketplace.84
In the Seventh Circuit, courts sometimes decrease percentages marginally
with recovery size-for example, paying the lawyer one-third of the first
$100 million of a recovery and 25 percent of the next $100 million. 85 As I
noted above, the economic models prefer fixed or marginally increasing
percentages; marginally decreasing percentages exacerbate rather than
mitigate agency costs. 86 Although the data from sophisticated clients that I

81. Fitzpatrick, supra note 71, at 838 ("[I]t appears that fee percentages tended to drift
lower at a fairly slow pace until a settlement size of $100 million was reached, at which point
the fee percentages plunged well below 20 percent, and by the time $500 million was reached,
they plunged well below 15 percent, with most awards at that level under even 10 percent.");
see also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 75, at 265 (reporting a mean fee of 12.0 percent and

a median fee of 10.2 percent for recoveries over $175.5 million).
82. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that

"[u]nder the district court's approach" of capping attorneys' fees at 10 percent of recovery for
settlements over $75 million, "no sane lawyer would negotiate a settlement of more than $74
million and less than $225 million; even the higher figure would make sense only if it were
no more costly to obtain $225 million for the class than to garner $74 million"); FITZPATRICK,

supra note 7, at 93-94 (providing an example and explaining "if you pay the lawyer a bigger
percentage of smaller sums, he or she is better off sometimes resolving cases for smaller
sums").
83. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
84. In re Synthroid, 264 F.3d at 718 ("[C]ounsel for the consumer class could have

received $22 million in fees had they settled for $74 million but were limited to $8.2 million
in fees because they obtained an extra $14 million for their clients (the consumer fund, recall,
is $88 million). Why there should be such a notch is a mystery. Markets would not tolerate
that effect; the district court's approach compels it.").
85. Id. ("A notch could be avoided if the 10% cap in 'megafund' cases were applied only
to the portion of the recovery that exceeded $74 million, but that is not what the district court
did; it capped fees at 10% of the whole fund.").
86. See Fisch, supra note 38, at 678 ("Because it fails to align counsel's interests with
those of the plaintiff class at high levels of recovery, a declining percentage of recovery fee
structure is especially likely to create a significant moral hazard problem."); see also In re
Synthroid, 264 F.3d at 721 ("[D]eclining marginal percentages . . create declining marginal
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discussed did not find any marginally decreasing rates, such rates are at least
not unheard of in the marketplace. 87 Nonetheless, given that they increase
agency costs and even sophisticated clients apparently do not use them often
(as I said, I suspect because it is so difficult to set the cut points ex ante),88
judges should not use them either, unless judges believe they can monitor
and set cut points better than even large corporations believe they cansomething, I have said, that I find implausible. Rather, judges should either
stick with fixed percentages that do not vary with recovery or use percentages
that escalate with litigation maturity, like sophisticated clients usually do.
(Although escalating percentages based on recovery size are, too, not
unheard of,89 they introduce the same cut-point problem discussed above.)
CONCLUSION

If judges want to act as fiduciaries for absent class members like they say
they do, then they should award attorneys' fees in class actions the way that
rational class members who cannot monitor their lawyers well would do so
at the outset of the case. Economic models suggest two ways to do this: (1)
pay class counsel a fixed or escalating percentage of the recovery or (2) pay
class counsel a percentage of the recovery plus a contingent lodestar. Which
method is better depends on whether it is easier to verify class counsel's
lodestar (which favors the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage method) or to
monitor against premature settlement (which favors the percentage method)
as well as whether it is possible to run an auction to determine the market
percentage for the contingent-lodestar-plus-percentage method. The (albeit
limited) data from sophisticated clients who hire lawyers on contingency
shows that such clients overwhelmingly prefer to monitor against premature
settlement, since they always choose the percentage method. Whether the
percentage should be fixed or escalating depends on how well clients can do
this monitoring. Data from sophisticated clients shows both that they choose
to pay fixed one-third percentages or even higher escalating percentages
based on litigation maturity just like unsophisticated clients do, and they do
so even in the most enormous cases. Unless judges believe they can monitor
returns to legal work ....
This feature exacerbates the agency costs inherent in any
percentage-of-recovery system.").
87. See Silvermanv. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Awarding

counsel a decreasing percentage of the higher tiers of recovery enables them to recover the
principal costs of litigation from the first bands of the award, while allowing the clients to reap
more of the benefit at the margin (yet still preserving some incentive for lawyers to strive for
these higher awards)."); In re Synthroid, 264 F.3d at 721 (noting that "negotiations and

auctions often produce diminishing marginal fees when the recovery will not necessarily
increase in proportion to the number of hours devoted to the case").
88. Daniel Rubinfeld and Suzanne Scotchmer have reported that such arrangements are
"quite common," but they did not cite anything for that assertion. See Rubinfeld & Scotchmer,
supra note 22, at 415.
89. See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2006). This case described

the following fee agreement between class counsel and "the lead plaintiff New Hampshire
Retirement Systems": "The formula provided attorneys' fees would equal 15% of any
settlement amount up to $25 million, 20% of any settlement amount between $25 million and
$50 million, and 25% of any settlement amount over $50 million."
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differently than sophisticated corporate clients can, judges acting as good
fiduciaries should follow these practices as well. This conclusion calls into
question several fee practices commonly used by judges today: (1)
presuming that class counsel should earn only 25 percent of any recovery,
(2) reducing that percentage further if class counsel recovers more than $100
million, and (3) reducing that percentage even further if it exceeds class
counsel's lodestar by some multiple.
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APPENDIX

Direct PurchaserPharmaceuticalAntitrust Settlements, April 2003 April
2020

Hartig Drug
November

Co. v. Senju

9, 2018

Pharmaceutical

$9,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

No

$41,500,000

33.33%

N/A

None

No

Antitrust

$166,000,000

27.11%

33.33%

None

Yes

July 18,
2018

In re Solodyn
(Minocycline
Hydrochloride)

$76,846,250

31.45%

N/A

None

No

April 18,

American Sales

2018

Co. v. Pfizer,
94

$94,000,000

32.69%

33.33%

None

Yes

Co.90
October

In re Blood
Reagents

24, 2018

Antitrust

Litigation 9l
September In re Lidoderm

20, 2018

Litigation9 2

Antitrust
Litigation9 3

Inc.

90. Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiff Hartig Drug Co. Inc. & Defendants Senju
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., Kyorin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. & Allergan, Inc., Hartig Drug Co.
v. Senju Pharm. Co., No. 14-00719 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018).
91. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for (1) an Award of Attorneys' Fees, (2)
Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses & (3) Service Awards for the Class Representatives,
In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 09-2081 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2018).

92. Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement with Direct Purchaser Class & Entering
Final Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice, In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md02521 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2018).
93. Settlement Agreement Between Implax Laboratories, Inc. & the Direct Purchaser
Class, In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 14-md-2503 (D.

Mass. Mar. 10, 2018).
94. Order Granting Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement & Distribution Plan, Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses,
Service Awards to the Class Representative Plaintiffs & Entry of Final Judgment & Order of
Dismissal, Am. Sales Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 14-cv-00361 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2018).
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December In re Aggrenox
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$146,000,000

33.33%

33.33%

None

Yes

Antitrust

$15,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

Castro v.
Sanofi Pasteur,
97

$61,500,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

2017

In re K-Dur
Antitrust98

$60,200,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

October
15, 2015

King Drug Co.
of Florence v.
Cephalon,

$512,000,000

27.50%

N/A

None

Yes

$98,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

Antitrust

19, 2017

Litigation 9 5

December
De 1b
October
23, 2017

In re Asacol
Litigation 96

Inc.

October 5

Litigation

Inc.99

2015

In re Prograf
Antitrust
Litigationt00

95. Final Judgment & Order of Dismissal, In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md02516 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2017).
96. Order & Final Judgment Finding Notice to Satisfy Due Process, Approving
Settlement, Awarding Attorneys' Fees & Expenses, Approving Service Awards to
Representative Plaintiffs & Ordering Dismissal with Prejudice, In re Asacol Antitrust Litig.,
No. 15-cv-12730 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2017).
97. Order for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses & Payment of
Service Awards to the Class Representatives, Castro v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., No. 11-cv-7178
(D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2017).

98. Order Granting Final Judgment & Order of Dismissal Approving Direct Purchaser
Class Settlement & Dismissing Direct Purchaser Class Claims Against Defendants, In re KDur Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1419, No. 01-cv-01652 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2017).
99. Order Granting Final Judgment & Order of Dismissal Approving Direct Purchaser
Class Settlement & Dismissing Direct Purchaser Class Claims Against the Cephalon
Defendants, King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-cv-01797 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15,

2015).
100. Order & Final Judgment Approving Settlement, Awarding Attorneys' Fees
Expenses, Awarding Representative Plaintiff Incentive Awards, Approving Plan of Allocation
&

May 20,

& Ordering Dismissal with Prejudice, In re Prograf Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2242 (D. Mass.

May 20, 2015).
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In re Prandin
Direct
Purchaser
Antitrust

January
20, 2015
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$19,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$15,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

No

$190,416,438

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$73,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$64,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

No

Litigation101
Mylan
Pharmaceutical

September
15, 2014

s, Inc. v.
Warner
Chilcott Public
Ltd. Co.102

August 6,

Wholesale

2014

Drug Co. v.
Pfizer, Inc. 103

Louisiana

In re Skelaxin

June 30,
2014

(Metaxalone)
Antitrust
Litigation104
In re PlasmaDerivative

Protein
Therapies
Antitrust
Litigation105

101. Order & Final Judgment Approving Class Action Settlement, In re Prandin Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 10-cv-12141 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2015).
102. Order, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. Civ. 12-3824 (E.D.

Pa. Sept. 15, 2015).
103. Final Judgment & Order of Dismissal Approving Proposed Class Settlement
Dismissing Actions, La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 02-1830 & 02-2731 (D.N.J.
&

April 16,
2014

Aug. 6, 2014).

104. Order Granting Class Counsel's Motion for Attorney Fees, Reimbursement of
Expenses & Awards for the Named Plaintiffs, In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig.,
MDL No. 2343, No. 12-cv-83 (E.D. Tenn. June 30, 2014).

105. Corrected Order & Judgment Approving Settlement & Dismissing with Prejudice
Baxter International, Inc. & Baxter Healthcare Corporation, In re Plasma-Derivative Protein
Therapies Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2109, No. 09 C 7666 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2014).
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American Sales

Co. v.

June 14,
2013

Smithkline
Beecham
Corp.106

$150,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$45,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$37,500,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$17,250,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$20,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

Louisiana
Wholesale

April 10,
2013

Drug Co. v.
Becton
&

Dickinson
Co. 107

November
7, 2012

In re
Wellbutrin XL
Antitrust
Litigation1 08
Rochester Drug

May 31,

Co-Operative,
Inc., v.

2012

Braintree

Laboratories
Inc. 109

Antitrust

Litigation 110

106. Final Order & Judgment Approving Settlement, Am. Sales Co. v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., No. 08-cv-3149 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2013).

107. Order & Final Judgment Approving Direct Purchaser Class Settlement, Awarding
Attorneys' Fees & Expenses, Awarding Incentive Awards to Class Representatives,
Approving Plan of Allocation & Dismissing Claims Against Defendant, La. Wholesale Drug
Co. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., MDL No. 1730, No. 05-cv-1602 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2013).
108. Final Order & Judgment Approving Settlement, In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig.,

No. 08-cv-2431 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2012).
109. Order & Final Judgment Approving Settlement, Awarding Attorneys' Fees
Expenses, Awarding Representative Plaintiff Incentive Awards, Approving Plan of Allocation
& Ordering Dismissal as to the Defendant, Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc., v. Braintree
&

2u2

Lab'ys, Inc., No. 07-142 (D. Del. May 31, 2012).

110. Order & Final Judgment Approving Settlement, Awarding Attorneys' Fees
Expenses, Awarding Representative Plaintiffs Incentive Awards, Approving Plan of
&

12,

In re
Metoprolol
Succinate
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November
28, 2011
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In re DDAVP
Direct
Purchaser
Antitrust

$20,250,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$49,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

Litigation 111
November
21, 2011

In re
Wellbutrin SR
Antitrust
11 2

Litigation
August

Meijer, Inc. v.

11, 2011

Abbott
Laboratories 113

$52,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

In re
Nifedipine
Antitrust

$35,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$16,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

January
31, 2011

Litigation 114
January

In re Oxycontin

25, 2011

Litigation 115

Antitrust

Allocation & Ordering Dismissal as to All Defendants, In re Metoprolol Succinate Antitrust
Litig., No. Civ 06-52 (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2012).

&

111. Order & Final Judgment Approving Settlement Between Purchaser Class Plaintiffs
Defendants Ferring B.V., Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc. & Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., In
re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 05 Civ. 2237 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).

112. Order & Final Judgment Approving Direct Purchaser Class Settlement & Awarding
Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Costs & Class Representative Awards, In re Wellbutrin
SR Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 04-5525 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2011).

113. Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement & Entering Final Judgment of Dismissal
with Prejudice, Meijer, Inc. v. Abbott Lab'ys, No. C. 07-5985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011).

114. Order Granting Class Counsel's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees,
Reimbursement of Additional Expenses & Awards to Certified Class Representatives, In re
Nifedipine Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1515, No. 03-MC-223 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2011).

&

115. Order & Final Judgment Approving Settlement Between Direct Purchaser Class
Plaintiffs & Defendants Purdue Pharma L.P., Perdue Frederick Co., P.F. Laboratories, Inc.,
Purdue Pharmaceuticals L.P. & Purdue Pharma Inc., Awarding Attorneys' Fees & Expenses,
Awarding Representative Plaintiff Incentive Awards, Approving Plan of Allocation
Ordering Dismissal as to All Defendants, In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., No. 04-md-1603
(Jan. 25, 2011 S.D.N.Y.).
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1177

In re Tricor
April 23,
2009

Direct
Purchaser
Litigation 116

$250,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$22,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$75,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

Yes

$74,572,327

32.41%

N/A

None

Yes

$50,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

No

Meijer, Inc. v.
April20

Pharmacutical
s, Inc.

117

In re Remeron
Direct
November
Purchaser
9, 2005
Antitrust
Litigation 118

In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride
Antitrust

April 19,
2005

Litigation

119

North Shore
HematologyNovember

Oncology

30, 2004

Associates,
P.C. v. BristolMyers Squibb
Co. 120

&

116. Order & Final Judgment Approving Settlement, Awarding Attorneys' Fees
Expenses, Awarding Representative Plaintiff Incentive Awards, Approving Plan of Allocation
& Ordering Dismissal as to All Defendants, In re Tricor Direct Purchaser Litig., No. 05-340
(D. Del. Apr. 23, 2009).

&

117. Order & Final Judgment Approving Settlement Between Direct Purchaser Class
Plaintiffs & Defendant Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Awarding Attorneys' Fees & Expenses,
Awarding Representative Plaintiff Incentive Awards, Approving Plan of Allocation
Ordering Dismissal as to All Defendants, Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharms., Inc., No. Civ. 05-2195
(D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2009).

118. Final Judgment & Order of Dismissal Approving Proposed Settlement & Dismissing
Actions, In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 03-CV-0085 (D.N.J. Nov. 9,
2005).
119. Order & Final Judgment, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., MDL No.
99-1317, Nos. 98-3125 & 99-7143 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2005).

120. Final Order & Judgment Approving Settlement Between Class Plaintiff & Defendant
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, N. Shore Hematology-Oncology Assocs., P.C. v. BristolMyers Squibb Co., No. 04cv248 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2004).
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In re Relafen
Antitrust
Litigationl 2l

$175,000,000

33.33%

N/A

None

No

$220,000,000

32.96%

N/A

None

Yes

3/33

0/33

26/33

Louisiana

April 11
2003

Wholesale
Drug Co. v.

Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co.122

N = 33
Median =
33.33%
Mean =

32.85%

121. Order & Final Judgment, In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., No. 01-12239 (D. Mass. Apr.
9, 2004).

122. Order & Final Judgment, La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., MDL
No. 1413, No. 01-CV-7951 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2003).

